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This paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a partnership
as the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gains and a ‘cost’ associated with
the partial loss of control over the decisions the partnership takes.
For instance, by forming a monetary union, countries beneﬁt from a
more coordinated monetary policy. However, due to the partial loss of
control over the union decision, the policy implemented might diﬀer
from the policy a member would have taken on their own. We interpret
this possible diﬀerence as a cost. We notably show that individuals
with “similar” characteristics form a partnership, and the more diverse
the characteristics, the smaller the partnership size.
Keywords: Partnerships, coalitions, alliances, endogenous forma-
tion, eﬃciency gains, loss of control, diverse characteristics, opinions.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D7
∗This paper is a substantial revision of Renou (2003). I owe Pierpaolo Battigalli and
Larry Samuelson a special debt for their insightful comments and encouragements. I am
also grateful to Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch, Guillaume Carlier, Pascal Courty, Christopher
Findlay, John Hatch, Martin Hellwig, Bart Lipman, Jean-Marc Tallon and Anne Villamil
for helpful discussions. I thank the THEMA, University Cergy-Pontoise, where part of
this paper was written, for their hospitality.
†School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide 5005, Australia. Phone: +61
(0)8 8303 4930, Fax: +61 (0)8 8223 1460. ludovic.renou@adelaide.edu.au
1Partnerships, April 7, 2006 2
1 Introduction
Many human activities are organized in partnerships, groups, alliances, or
coalitions: World Trade Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
European Monetary Union, law partnerships, ﬁsheries, marriages, industry
cartels, just to name a few.1 Arguably, the main rationale for individuals
to form partnerships is to beneﬁt from eﬃciency gains such as economies of
scale, cost reductions, exchanges of information, transfer of knowledge, spe-
cialization, etc. Another essential feature is that the decisions a partnership
takes are often partly out of the control of the individuals composing the
partnership or, in the hands of a few of its members e.g., a board of share-
holders, a hiring committee, etc. For instance, decisions might be put to a
vote or delegated to an agent acting on behalf of the partnership. Conse-
quently, a partnership might take decisions that some of its members would
not have taken on their own. In this paper, we interpret the diﬀerence in
payoﬀs resulting from the decisions the partnership takes and the ones an
individual would have taken on its own as the cost associated with the loss
of control over the partnership decisions. The aim of this paper is to analyze
the endogenous formation of a partnership as the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency
gains and the cost associated with the partial loss of control over the decisions
a partnership takes.
To highlight the prevalence of this trade-oﬀ, let us consider several ex-
amples. The ﬁrst series of examples concerns the formation of international
organizations. For instance, beneﬁts from joining the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) include access to markets without discrimination, increased
specialization and more coordinated trade policies. Decisions WTO takes
are governed by qualiﬁed majority rules.2 Thus, the WTO might take a
decision, for example to maintain a trade tariﬀ, that some of its members
would have abolished. Similar considerations apply to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (Sandler and Hartley (2002)) or the European Mone-
tary Union (Kohler (2002)).3 By forming a monetary union, countries beneﬁt
1In this paper, the word “partnership” is used generically for groups, alliances, coali-
tions, organizations, etc.
2The WTO continues GATTs tradition of making decisions not by voting but by con-
sensus. Where consensus is not possible, the WTO agreement allows for voting. The WTO
Agreement envisages several speciﬁc situations involving voting, which are governed either
by the unanimity rule, or a two-thirds majority rule or a three-quarters majority rule.
3Maggi and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2006) develop a model of self-enforcing voting that ex-Partnerships, April 7, 2006 3
from a more coordinated monetary policy at the cost of partially losing con-
trol over the monetary policy implemented. A country in recession might
desire a reduction of the common interest rate while the central bank might
increase the interest rate because of inﬂation pressures in the union. Sec-
ond, in industrial organization, cartels and research ventures are examples of
partnerships that beneﬁt from eﬃciency gains. For instance, Nocke (1999)
studies the formation of cartels when ﬁrms face capacity constraints. Firms
in a cartel beneﬁts then from increased capacity. Similarly, d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien and Zang (1993), study the formation of co-
operative research ventures where ﬁrms beneﬁt from cost-reduction.4 In all
these examples, the decisions a partnership takes e.g., which R&D projects
to ﬁnance, might diﬀer from the decision a member might take on their own.
Another example is households. By forming a household, individuals might
beneﬁt from economies of scale e.g., a more favorable tax bracket, to aﬀord
a better apartment, or simply being together. However, choices households
make are often the result of compromises. As a last example, individuals
often invest in asset funds not only to economize on monitoring, legal, or
screening costs but also to share risks. However, the investment decisions
i.e., the portfolio allocations, the fund management takes is likely to diﬀer
from the decision an individual would take due to diﬀerent attitudes toward
risks, opinions or time horizons. (See Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott
(1986) and Genicot and Ray (2003).)
At the heart of our trade-oﬀ is therefore the possibility that a partner-
ship might take a decision that an individual would not have taken on their
own. Several explanations might convey this possibility. For instance, Eliaz,
Ray and Razin (2006) present a model of choice shifts in between the choice
an individual would make on their own and the choice a partnership would
make. Their model elegantly captures the decision a partnership takes by
a pair of probabilities: the probability that an individual is pivotal and the
probability distribution over outcomes conditional on an individual not be-
ing pivotal.5 These authors notably show that choice shifts in partnership
decision-making is equivalent to individual preferences exhibiting a form of
the Allais paradox. Sobel (2006) shows that choice shifts might be the conse-
quences of an information aggregation problem within the partnership. Since
plains most of the modes of governance encountered in international organizations.
4For further examples, we refer the reader to Bloch (2003).
5This probability is endogenous in our model.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 4
the focus of the paper is on the endogenous formation of a partnership, we
follow a simpler route to model the possibility that a partnership might take
a diﬀerent decision than the one some of its members would have taken on
their own. We assume that individuals diﬀer in some of their characteristics
e.g., abilities, tastes, risk attitudes, opinions.
More precisely, we propose a simple model with costly actions to analyze
the consequences of the above trade-oﬀ on the endogenous formation of a
partnership. Individuals can either participate in a partnership or stand
alone. We ﬁrst assume that individuals diﬀer in their opinions (beliefs) about
the payoﬀ of two actions x and y, and those opinions are purely subjective.
Diﬀerences in opinions are the simplest and most tractable form of diﬀerences
in characteristics. Second, we assume that a partnership member is chosen
at random to choose between x and y for the partnership, or in other words,
a member of the partnership is pivotal with some probability less than one.
While this assumption might appear crude, it naturally captures the idea that
the decisions the partnership takes are partly out of control of individuals
composing the partnership without specifying the exact details of the decision
process e.g., voting with super-majority, qualiﬁed majority, bargaining, etc.
Finally, eﬃciency gains are modelled as cost eﬃciency; the more individuals
in the partnership, the lower the cost per individual of taking action x or y
is.
The ﬁrst important result is that individuals with “similar” characteris-
tics form a partnership, and more extreme individuals stand on their own.
The intuition for this result is simple. By participating in a partnership,
individual i beneﬁts from eﬃciency gains, on the one hand. On the other
hand, the partnership might take decision x even though individual i believes
action y to be more proﬁtable. This potential disagreement arises precisely
because individuals have diverse opinions. Therefore, if individual i perceives
the potential disagreement to be strong enough, he might prefer to stand-
alone. It is also worth noting that it might well be the case that even though
individuals have diﬀerent opinions about the payoﬀs of x and y, they might
all agree that x strictly dominates y, in which case there is no possibility of
choice shifts. We then perform some comparative statics. We show that as
eﬃciency gains increase, the expected size of the partnership increases while
if opinions are more diverse, the expected size of the partnership decreases.
Finally, a counter-intuitive result is that the largest partnership is not neces-Partnerships, April 7, 2006 5
sarily the most eﬃcient one. It is indeed true that the more individuals are
in the partnership, the higher the eﬃciency gains are. However, the more
individuals in the partnership, the more often the less eﬃcient action might
be chosen. To see this, suppose that there are only two individuals, action x
pays oﬀ 1 in a good state and 1/2 in a bad state, and that the cost of taking
action x is 1 standing alone and 1/2 in a partnership of two individuals.
Moreover, suppose that action y pays oﬀ 0 in either state and is costless.
Clearly, if an individual stands alone, he will not take action x regardless of
his beliefs about the state while he will take action x in a partnership. There-
fore, the total cost is 1 if the partnership forms, but it is zero if individuals
stand alone.
The closest contribution to ours is Farell and Scotchmer (1988). They
consider a model in which individuals diﬀer in abilities and can form part-
nerships to exploit economies of scale. Partners are assumed to share equally
the partnership’s payoﬀ. They study the core allocation of individuals into
partnerships, and notably show that partnerships are composed of “similar”
individuals, a result similar to ours. Moreover, if abilities are uniformly dis-
tributed, the largest partnership is composed of individuals with the highest
abilities. An essential diﬀerence between their approach and our approach
is that we explicitly model the endogenous formation of a partnership while
their approach is cooperative. Moreover, they do not explicitly model the
cost associated with forming a partnership, but simply assume that eﬃciency
gains per individual are decreasing after some threshold.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
equilibrium analysis is exposed in Section 3, while Section 4 contains some
comparative statics. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Ap-
pendix.
2 A model with costly actions
We consider a model with costly actions and N individuals. Individuals can
form a partnership to beneﬁt from eﬃciency gains (cost reductions). How-
ever, the decision the partnership takes might diﬀer from the decision any
individual would have taken on their own. This possibility of disagreement
(choice shift) constitutes an implicit cost to form a partnership, and we ana-
lyze the formation of a partnership as the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gainsPartnerships, April 7, 2006 6
and cost associated with the loss of control over the decision the partnership
takes.
Formally, each individual on their own and the partnership have to choose
an action in {x,y}. Taking action x (resp., y) yields a payoﬀ of x (resp., y)
in state θ and x (resp., y) in state θ. We can interpret an action as an
investment in a ﬁnancial asset or a R&D project, the adoption of a new
standard, the choice of a vacation place, or more broadly any political or
economic decision. The state θ ∈ {θ,θ} is unknown to the individuals.
Furthermore, taking an action is costly. It costs cx of utils to take action
x while it costs cy to take action y. We can think of the cost as an admin-
istrative cost, the cost to gather and process information, the cost to buy a
ﬂight ticket, etc. The cost to take action z ∈ {x,y} is cz(n) per individual
in a partnership of n members. We assume that cz( ) is non-increasing in
n, and cz(1) = cz for z ∈ {x,y}.6 For instance, if the cost to take an action
is ﬁxed, the partnership might share it among its n members, or buying a
bundle of two ﬂight tickets might be cheaper than buying two single tick-
ets. Thus, if an individual is a member of a partnership of n members and
the partnership takes action x and the state is θ, his payoﬀ is x − cx(n),
higher than the payoﬀ he gets if he takes action x on its own. By joining a
partnership, an individual beneﬁts from eﬃciency gains.
2.1 Diﬀerences in characteristics: opinions
We assume that individuals diﬀer in their opinions about the likelihood of θ
being either θ or θ. Diﬀerences in opinions is the simplest and most tractable
form of diﬀerences in tastes or characteristics; more complicated diﬀerences
in characteristics complicate the analysis of the model without adding to the
results. Formally, individual i believes that the state θ occurs with proba-
bility pi. These are pure diﬀerences in prior opinions, and we assume that
neither player is better informed than the others about the state. Moreover,
prior beliefs are privately known, and each individual believes that the beliefs
of his opponents are independently and identically distributed with distribu-
6More complex cost functions do not change the qualitative results of the paper. For
instance, assuming that cz( ) is decreasing in n for n ≤ n∗
z, and increasing otherwise,
strengthens the conclusions of the paper.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 7
tion µ.7 Unless indicated otherwise, µ is assume to be absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In the Appendix, we show that the
belief pi of individual i can be interpreted as his type.8
Besides its simplicity, the above formulation captures the natural idea
that individuals have diﬀerent models for assessing the likelihood of θ, and
that each individual is absolutely convinced that his model is the correct
model (assumption B0, below). As a familiar example (due to Kandel and
Pearson (1995)), consider two well-trained economists, one from Chicago
and the other from Cambridge, Massachusetts. They have access to the
same data, but if asked to comment on the consequences of current economic
policies, they would certainly oﬀer diﬀerent predictions. Such an outcome is
impossible if they use the same model to interpret the data. Furthermore,
they would certainly not alter their predictions after observing the other’s
predictions. Another example where individuals disagree about the proba-
bilities of events even when exposed to seemingly identical evidence appears
in a New York Time article (1993, p D4) by Fischer who observes that “after
Apple Computer Inc. announced a decline in earnings for its second ﬁscal
quarter, analysts rushed to revise their estimates for the year. Some revise
them downward, as one might expect, but some raised their estimates and
others even issued new buy recommendations”.
Finally, note that if µ is not degenerate, then there is no common prior. In
fact, it is impossible to reconcile the common prior assumption (henceforth,
CPA) with the assumption (B0) that each individual regards the state θ and
the opinions of others individuals as independent; and the assumption that
distinct types in the support of µ have diﬀerent beliefs about the state θ.
Intuitively, the latter assumption and the CPA imply that each individual
believes that other individuals’ beliefs are correlated with the state, thus
contradicting assumption B0.
2.2 The timing
The partnership formation game unfolds as follows (see Figure 1). In the ﬁrst
stage, all individuals simultaneously decide either to participate in a unique
7A more formal description is found in the Appendix. For similar assumptions, see
Eliaz and Spiegler (2005).
8More precisely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between pi and i’s hierarchy of












partnership, or to stand-alone. If an individual decides to participate in the
partnership, he delegates the decision between x and y to a manager, chosen
at random among the partnership’s members. In other words, as in Eliaz, Ray
and Razin (2006), in a partnership of n members, individual i is pivotal with
probability 1/n.9 More sophisticated procedures to determine the action the
partnership takes such as a voting or bargaining procedure would not aﬀect
the main results of this paper. Indeed, no matter what the procedure, the
crucial point is that the decision the partnership takes is partly out of the
control of each of the individuals composing the partnership. For simplicity,
multiple coalitions and deviations from the unique coalition to subcoalitions
(except stand-alone coalitions) are not considered. In the second stage, the
partnership and the stand-alone individuals choose an action.
The partnership formation game adopted in this paper is the extension
to a situation of incomplete information of the open membership game (see
Selten (1973), d’Aspremont et al (1983), Carraro (2003)) since, in an open
membership game, all players simultaneously announce “Yes” or “No”, and a
partnership is formed by all players announcing “Yes”. A reader might legit-
imately wonder whether main results of the paper are robust to alternatives
9Note that a probability to be pivotal of 1/n is the Shapley value of a majority vote
when voters are weighted equally. See Riker and Ordeshook (1968) for more on pivotal
probabilities. Our results are not altered if we assume more general pivotal probabilities
a(n) with a(n) decreasing in n.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 9
speciﬁcations of the partnership formation game. This is clearly a legitimate
question, but an extremely complicated one. Already, in coalition formation
games with asymmetric but complete information, there are few results on
the existence and characterization of stable coalition structures (see conclud-
ing remarks of Carraro (2003)). For the more delicate situation of incomplete
information, I am not aware of any papers generalizing coalition formation
games such as exclusive membership games or sequential bargaining games
to incomplete information.10 I can nonetheless oﬀer the reader an alterna-
tive speciﬁcation that, I conjecture, leaves unaltered the conclusions of the
present paper. Imagine that a selected individual (the principal) can pro-
pose incentive-compatible contracts to the others (the agents). A coalition is
formed by all individuals accepting a contract. Does there exist an optimal
menu of contracts that induces full participation? I conjecture that the an-
swer is no. Indeed, a key feature of this problem is that the outside option
of an individual is his expected payoﬀ to stand-alone, hence type-dependent.
Following Jullien (2000), we have strong reasons to suspect that the optimal
menu induces under-participation, and thus some types of any individual
would not participate in the partnership.
3 Main results
Notation: Hereafter, ]a,a[ denotes the open interval with endpoints a and
a while (a,a) denotes the point in R2 with coordinates a and a. We
say that a function f : X → R is increasing if for x > x′, f(x) > f(x′)
and nondecreasing if for x > x′, f(x) ≥ f(x′).
3.1 Payoﬀs
The expected payoﬀ of individual i, standing on its own, with beliefs pi is
pi∆x − γx if he takes action x and pi∆y − γy if he takes action y, where
∆z = z − z and γz = cz − z, z ∈ {x,y}. For simplicity, we normalize the
payoﬀ of action y to be 0, regardless of the beliefs of an individual, that is,
∆y = 0 and γy = 0, and assume that ∆x > 0.11 This normalization implies
10For instance, in the recent book edited by Carraro (2003) on the endogenous formation
of coalitions, this question is not even mentioned.
11All our results go through if we assume ∆x > ∆y, γx(n) > γy(n) for each n, and
γx(n) − γy(n) decreasing in n.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 10
that the higher the beliefs pi of individual i, the higher his expected payoﬀ.
We can thus interpret the beliefs of player i as a measure of his optimism or
pessimism: the higher pi, the more optimistic an individual is.
Suppose that individual i is in a partnership of n individuals and chosen
to be the manager (or, equivalently, is pivotal). His expected payoﬀ is then
pi∆x − γx(n),
if he takes action x with γx(n) = cx(n) − x, and 0, otherwise. Thus, costly
action generates a role for a partnership; and as it grows larger, the more
eﬃcient the partnership is, because of cost sharing. Since there is a one-to-
one relationship between cx( ) and γx( ), we will abusively refer to γx( ) as
the cost function in the sequel. It is worth mentioning that in our model, the
partnership is more eﬃcient because of cost sharing, but our result continues
to hold with any other form of eﬃciency gains.
3.2 Eﬃciency gains versus loss of control
For simplicity, we only consider symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Let
us illustrate, by means of an example, the problem an individual faces in
taking his decision to participate in a partnership or to stand-alone.
Example. Consider only two individuals i (he) and j (she), and let us
put ourselves in the shoes of individual i. If individual i stands alone, he
either takes action x (if his belief pi is such that pi∆x − γx ≥ 0) or takes
action y. Hence, his expected payoﬀ to stand-alone is max(0,pi∆x − γx).
Let us now consider the payoﬀ to player i if he decides to participate in
a partnership. First, if individual j does not participate (with probability
ϕ), individual i’s expected payoﬀ is again max(0,pi∆x − γx). Second, if
individual j also participates in the partnership (with probability 1 − ϕ),
individual i need to form an expectation on the decision individual j would
take if she is pivotal (with probability 1/2). If individual j’s belief pj is such
that pj∆x − γx(2) ≥ 0, she chooses action x, and if her belief is such that
pj∆x−γx(2) < 0, she chooses action y. However, individual i does not know
the beliefs of j, but expects that j takes action x with probability β, that
is, the probability that j takes action x conditional on j participating in the
partnership and being pivotal. With probability 1 − β, she takes action y.
This strategic uncertainty is at the heart of your problem: upon deciding toPartnerships, April 7, 2006 11
join a partnership or not, an individual is uncertain about the decision the
partnership will take in case he is not pivotal. Furthermore, individual i’s
expected payoﬀ is pi∆x − γx(2) if j takes action x, and 0 if she takes action
y. Finally, with probability 1/2, i is pivotal (or, equivalently, chosen to be
the manager), and his expected payoﬀ is max(0,pi∆x − γx(2)). Therefore,





[max(0,pi∆x − γx(2)) + β(pi∆x − γx(2))].
(1)
Hence, upon deciding whether to participate in a partnership or to stand-
alone, individual i of type pi compares (1) with his stand-alone expected
payoﬀ max(0,pi∆x −γx). Any type pi of individual i for which (1) is greater
than max(0,pi∆x−γx) participates in the partnership; the other types stand
alone. It is important to bear in mind that ϕ and β are endogenously deter-
mined at an equilibrium.
Reasoning along the lines of the above example, suppose that individual
i participates in a partnership of n individuals. With probability (1/n),
individual i is chosen to be the manager (or, equivalently, is pivotal), and his
expected payoﬀ is max(0,pi∆x − γx(n)). Hence, whether i takes action x or
y depends on his beliefs and the number of individuals participating in the
partnership. Moreover, with probability 1−(1/n), individual i is not chosen
to be the manager, and thus forms an expectation on the manager decision.
Let s : [0,1] → {0,1}, pi  → s(pi) be a symmetric equilibrium function,







0 if γx(n) ≤ 0,
γx(n)
∆x if ∆x > γx(n) > 0,
1 if γx(n) ≥ ∆x.
(2)
For ∆x > γx(n) > 0, pn is the probability of the event [θ = θ] that would
make the manager of a n-partnership indiﬀerent between action x and y.
Note that pn is decreasing in the number of partners n, and increasing in
the cost of action x, cx. If individual j also participates in the partnership
and is chosen to be the manager of the n-partnership, she takes action x if
pj ≥ pn, and action y, otherwise. Therefore, the probability β (n,s) that she
takes action x, conditional on participating in a partnership of n individualsPartnerships, April 7, 2006 12
and being pivotal is12
β (n,s) := Pr
 
pj ≥ p









Since opinions (beliefs) are privately known, individuals cannot infer the
optimal action of others at the equilibrium path. Consequently, an individual
may join the partnership, be chosen as the manager, and yet not take action
x since he might have joined a partnership with too few individuals to make
him taking action x.
The probability that any individual j  = i joins the partnership in a
symmetric equilibrium is µ({pj ∈ [0,1] : s(pj) = 1}), the probability measure
of the set of types participating in the partnership. Furthermore, since beliefs
are i.i.d, the probability that exactly (n − 1) individuals other than i join
the partnership is
ϕ(n − 1,s) := [µ({pj ∈ [0,1] : s(pj) = 1})]
n−1 (4)







a binomial density with parameters (µ({pj ∈ [0,1] : s(pj) = 1}),N − 1). It
follows that the expected payoﬀ of individual i of type pi to join the part-









max(0,pi∆x − γx(n)) +
n − 1
n




Observe that E1 is a continuous, piecewise linear, increasing function of pi.13
Alternatively, if individual i of type pi stands alone, his expected payoﬀ is
E
0 (pi) := max(0,pi∆x − γx(1)). (6)
Note that the expected payoﬀ to participate in a partnership is dependent
on s. Thus, to characterize the equilibria, we should ﬁnd a function s∗ such
that s∗(pi) = 1 if and only if E1(pi,s∗) ≥ E0(pi), and s∗(pi) = 0 if and only
12If µ{p ∈ [0,1] : s(p) = 1} = 0, then β( ,s) ≡ 0.
13Note that E1 is non diﬀerentiable at the points p1,...,pN.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 13
if E1(pi,s∗) ≤ E0(pi). Despite the simplicity of our model, this task will turn
out to be a diﬃcult one.
The trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gains and the cost associated with the
loss of control is not immediately apparent from equations (5) and (6). In the
next equation, we highlight the trade-oﬀ by writing the diﬀerence in payoﬀs













[β(n,s)(pi∆x − γx(n)) − max(0,pi∆x − γx(n))].
In Equation (7), the ﬁrst line captures the eﬃciency gains in participating
in a partnership, and is positive. Ceteris paribus, the more individuals are
in the partnership, the higher the gains for individual i to participate in a
partnership. The second line captures the cost associated with the loss of
control over the decision the partnership takes, and is negative. Conditional
on n individuals participating in the partnership, individual i is not pivotal
with probability (n−1)/n. When individual i is not pivotal, he expects that
the partnership takes action x with probability β(n,s) and action y with
probability 1 − β(n,s), hence, his expected payoﬀ is β(n,s)(pi∆x − γx(n)).
However, if individual i is pivotal, his expected payoﬀ is max(0,pi∆x−γx(n)).
It follows that the cost associated with the partial loss of control over the
decision the partnership takes is
n − 1
n
[β(n,s)(pi∆x − γx(n)) − max(0,pi∆x − γx(n))] ≤ 0.
Finally, note that we can think of β as the probability that a randomly
selected member of a n-partnership agrees with individual i of type pi ≥ pn
on the action to be chosen.
4 Equilibrium analysis
As a preliminary observation, note that a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium
of the partnership game exists. To see this, consider the strategy s∗(pi) = 0Partnerships, April 7, 2006 14
for all pi ∈ [0,1]. It follows that E0(pi) = E1 (pi,s∗) for all beliefs pi, hence
it is a best reply for all beliefs of each individual to stand on their own.
Intuitively, if each belief of each individual conjectures that every belief of
the other individuals will not participate in the partnership, then each belief
is indiﬀerent between standing alone and participating, hence standing-alone
is a best reply. Thus, there always exists trivial equilibria in which any type
of any individual stands alone.14 Moreover, observe that if γx(N) ≥ ∆x, then
any function s : [0,1] → {0,1} is an equilibrium function. Indeed, if the cost
γx(N) of taking x in a partnership of N individuals (the grand partnership)
oﬀsets the gain ∆x to be made, then action y is a strictly dominant action
regardless of an individual’s type, and thus each type of each individual is
indiﬀerent between standing alone and participating in the partnership.15
Moreover, the payoﬀ to each individual is zero in any of those equilibria.
However, if γx(N) < ∆x, it might exist others equilibria. The existence of
such non-trivial equilibria is our next task.
4.1 Extreme opinions stand on their own
We ﬁrst start with an important result about the equilibrium functions s,
that is, equilibrium functions are the indicator of some intervals.
Proposition 1 All symmetric equilibrium functions s : [0,1] → {0,1} are
the indicator of some intervals ]p,p[ or [p,p] .
Proposition 1 states that any equilibrium has a double cutoﬀ nature: for
all types pi ∈ [0,1] such that pi ≤ p and pi ≥ p, an individual stands alone.16
Thus, extreme opinions do not participate in the partnership; individuals
with “similar” opinions form the partnership. The intuition behind this result
is simple. The more optimistic (the higher pi) an individual, the higher is
expected payoﬀ to participate in a partnership as well as his expected payoﬀ
to stand-alone. Furthermore, we can show that the diﬀerence of expected
14Note that we cannot have E1(pi,s)−E0 (pi) < 0 for all pi ∈ [0,1], since then s(pi) = 0
for all pi, implying that E1(pi,s) − E0 (pi) = 0 for all pi, a contradiction.
15If we assume that, whenever indiﬀerent between standing alone and participating in
a partnership, an individual stands alone, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which
any type of any individual stands alone.
16For the beliefs pi = p or pi = p, an individual is indiﬀerent between participating in
the partnership and standing alone, hence standing alone is a best-reply. In the sequel,
we assume, for simplicity, that whenever indiﬀerent, an individual stands alone.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 15
payoﬀs E1( ,s) − E0 ( ) is increasing for pi < p1 and decreasing for pi ≥ p1.
Thus, if we ﬁnd a most pessimistic type p and a most optimistic type p such
that these two types are indiﬀerent between participating in the partnership
and standing alone, then every type in-between participates.
Before going further, several observations are worth doing. First, ex-
tremely pessimistic individuals do not join the partnership. More precisely,
every types of an individual with pi < pN do not join the partnership. To
see this, note that for those types, action x is strictly dominated by action
y regardless of whether they stand alone or participate in a partnership of
any size. Thus, the mere possibility that the partnership takes action x im-
plies that they prefer to stand on their own; they have nothing to gain from
participating in a partnership. Hence, it follows that p ≥ pN. Second, a
direct consequence of the above observation is that the indicator of ]p2,1] is
an equilibrium function for partnership games with two individuals (N = 2).
Intuitively, with two individuals, since types below p2 do not join the part-
nership, each individual knows that the types of his opponent that might join
the partnership is above p2, hence take action x regardless of the size of the
partnership (1 or 2). It then follows that there is no cost associated with the
loss of control over the partnership’s decision since any belief greater than
p2 is sure to be joined by beliefs also above p2 while there are gains to be
made from cost sharing.17 A last observation is that not only individuals
who would take action x standing on their own, but also individuals who
would take action y standing on their own, join the partnership. Formally,
we have p < p1 ≤ p. (A complete proof is found in Appendix.) For instance,
it is easy to see that any beliefs of an individual in between p2 and p1 join
the partnership. For those beliefs, the expected payoﬀ to stand-alone is zero,
while their expected payoﬀ to be in a partnership of two individuals or more
is strictly positive. However, for individuals with beliefs in between p3 and
p2, matters are more complicate as there is the risk to be in a partnership of
only two individuals and action x being taken (action x has negative expected
payoﬀ for those beliefs). Those beliefs might participate in the partnership
if the likelihood of being in a partnership of only two individuals and action
x being taken is suﬃciently small. Similarly, individuals with beliefs above
p1 might join the partnership if the likelihood of action y being chosen is
17Note that the proﬁle of strategy s(pi) = 1 if pi ∈]p2,1] and s(pi) = 0, otherwise, is
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suﬃciently small.
We can now continue the equilibria characterization. We ﬁrst take ad-
vantage of Proposition 1 to rewrite the problem of determining s. From
Proposition 1, it follows that knowing the open interval ]p,p[ is isomorphic
to knowing the strategy s, and, thus, we substitute s by p,p in Equations
(3)-(5). Moreover, we have that the probability that any individual partic-
ipates in the partnership is µ(]p,p[) since {p ∈ [0,1] : s(p) = 1} =]p,p[ in a
symmetric equilibrium. Hence, the probability that exactly (n − 1) individ-
uals other than i participate in the partnership follows a binomial density









Quite naturally, we now characterize a non-trivial equilibrium as the zero
of a map, and show that such a zero exists. Deﬁne the map Γ : Σ :=  











E1(p,p,p) − E0 (p)
 
. (9)
Note that the map Γ is a continuous function of p and p. An equilib-
rium (p,p) is the solution of (p,1 − p)   Γ(p,p) ≥ 0, with Γ(p,p) = 0 if
(p,p)  = (0,1). As already mentioned, the set
 





(p,p) : Γ(p,p) = 0
 
.18 Moreover, it is easy to show that these
points are critical points, that is to say, the Jacobian of Γ evaluated in  
(p,p) : p = p
 
does not have full rank.
A non-trivial equilibrium (p,p) is then a zero of Γ, which does not belong
to the set
 
(p,p) : p = p
 
, hence, in a non-trivial equilibrium, the probability
to participate in the partnership is strictly positive.
Theorem 1 If γx(N) < ∆x, there exists a non-trivial equilibrium.
Thus, if there are potential gains to form a partnership, an equilibrium
exists in which some types of individuals form a partnership. Several addi-
tional remarks are worth doing.
18This is equivalent to s(pi) = 0 for all pi ∈ [0,1].Partnerships, April 7, 2006 17
First, for γx < 0, action x strictly dominates action y regardless of the
beliefs of an individual and whether an individual is member of a partnership
or stand-alone. Hence, all individuals of any type agree that the best action is
x, and since there are eﬃciency gains to form a partnership, any type (beliefs)
of any individual has thus an incentive to form partnership in a non-trivial






ϕ(n − 1,p,p)(pi∆x − γx(n)),
a point in the convex hull of {pi∆x−γx,...,pi∆x−γx(N)} for all pi ∈ [0,1].
Since γx( ) is decreasing in n, we have that pi∆x − γx is the minimizer of
E1 for all pi. Therefore, there are only two equilibria, either all individuals
stand alone independently of their types or all participate in the partnership
independently of their types. It is also worth noticing that the stand-alone
equilibrium is in weakly dominated strategies. Similarly, if γx(2) < 0 < γx,
the grand partnership is the unique non-trivial equilibrium. Intuitively, if
γx(2) < 0, every types of any individual in a partnership of two individuals
or more agree that the best action is x. There is no disagreement over the best
decision to take in a partnership, and therefore the grand partnership forms.
Moreover, participating in a partnership is a weakly dominant strategy. It is
nonetheless important to bear in mind that individuals still disagree about
the likelihood of the state θ; they simply all agree that x is the best action to
take. In other words, diﬀerence in characteristics is not suﬃcient for choice
shifts.
Second, if eﬃciency gains are suﬃciently mild and beliefs suﬃciently di-
verse, we can easily show that it is not an equilibrium for all types above
p to participate in the partnership (p < 1). In other words, extremely pes-
simistic and optimistic individuals do not join the partnership. Lastly, if in
two non-trivial equilibria, the probability to participate in the partnership is
equal, then these two equilibria are the same. Formally,
Lemma 1 If in two non-trivial equilibria (p,p) and (p′,p′), the probability
to participate in the partnership is the same, i.e., µ(]p,p[) = µ(]p′,p′[), then
(p,p) = (p′,p′).Partnerships, April 7, 2006 18
In the previous discussion, we have shown that the partnership formation
game possesses trivial equilibria and, at least, one non-trivial equilibrium.19
To overcome the problem of the multiplicity of equilibria, we assume that in-
dividuals coordinate on a most comprehensive equilibrium, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium (p∗,p∗) is said to be a most comprehensive equi-




Thus, in a most comprehensive equilibrium, the probability to partici-
pate in the partnership is maximal. A desirable, if not essential, property
of a selected equilibrium is eﬃciency. For games of complete information,
the concept of eﬃciency is clearly deﬁned. However, for games of incom-
plete information, as ours, the concept of eﬃciency becomes more diﬃcult
to apprehend. In this paper, we use the concepts of interim eﬃciency (see
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)).20 For the sake of completeness, we recall its
deﬁnition: If every individual prefers a given equilibrium over an alternative
equilibrium when he knows his type, whatever his type might be, then the
given equilibrium interim dominates the alternative one. And we say that
an equilibrium is interim eﬃcient if there exists no other equilibrium that
interim dominates it. Thus, interim eﬃciency is the appropriate concept
of eﬃciency for games of incomplete information, in which the individuals
already know their type when the play of the game begins. We show that a
most comprehensive equilibrium has some appealing properties.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique most comprehensive equilibrium. Moreover,
it is interim eﬃcient.
Uniqueness of the most comprehensive equilibrium follows from Lemma
1. As for eﬃciency, consider the most comprehensive equilibrium. For any
alternative equilibrium, there exists a set of types of positive measure par-
ticipating in the partnership in the most comprehensive equilibrium and
19In fact, the argument used to prove the existence of at least one non-trivial equilibrium
guarantees than there exists an odd number of trivial equilibria. Moreover, they are locally
unique.
20Holmstrom and Myerson make the distinction between classical eﬃciency and
incentive-compatible eﬃciency. In the paper, we refer to their concept of classical eﬃ-
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standing-alone in the alternative equilibrium; and these types of an individ-
ual obtain a higher expected payoﬀ in the most comprehensive equilibrium.
Therefore, no alternative equilibrium can interim dominate the most com-
prehensive equilibrium, hence the most comprehensive equilibrium is interim
eﬃcient. Formally, consider the most comprehensive equilibrium (p∗,p∗) and







for all type in ]p∗,p∗[∩([0,1]\]p,p[), a set of positive measure. 21 Hence,
the most comprehensive equilibrium cannot be interim dominated. Besides
interim eﬃciency, the most comprehensive equilibrium has another interest-
ing property: it maximizes the eﬃciency gains under mild conditions. Thus,
the most comprehensive equilibrium would be the one selected by a social
planner, who aims at maximizing the eﬃciency gains.
Proposition 2 Assume that the cost function satisﬁes: limn→+∞cx(n) = 0,
ncx(n) increasing in n, and limn→+∞ ncx(n) < +∞. There exists an integer
  N such that for N >   N, the most comprehensive equilibrium maximizes the
eﬃciency gains or, equivalently, minimizes the total expected cost.
Note that if the cost cx of taking action x is equally shared among the
partnership members, i.e., cx(n) = cx/n, then the assumptions of Proposition
2 are satisﬁed. To ﬁx idea, suppose (for the time being) that all individuals
have chosen action x and there are n individuals in the partnership. The
total cost is (N − n)cx + ncx(n), a decreasing function of n. The more
individuals are in the partnership, the lower the total cost is. This is the
main idea behind Proposition 2. However, matters are more complex since
the partnership might choose with a higher probability action x than stand-
alone individuals. In other words, it is less costly for the partnership to
take action x, but the partnership might take more often action x. To get
intuition for this result, compare the total expected cost µ([pN,1])Ncx(N)
if all individuals participate in the partnership and the total expected cost
µ([p1,1])Ncx if all individuals stand alone. We indeed have eﬃciency gains
cx(N) < cx, but the partnership takes action x with a higher probability
21Observe that if (p,p) is a trivial equilibrium, then µ(]p∗,p∗[∩([0,1]\]p,p[)) =
µ(]p∗,p∗[), hence of positive measure. If (p,p) is a non-trivial equilibrium, then
]p∗,p∗[∩]p,p[ = ∅ since p∗ < p1 < p∗, p < p1 < p, and equilibria are locally unique,
hence ]p∗,p∗[∩([0,1]\]p,p[) is of positive measure.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 20
i.e., µ([pN,1]) < µ([p1,1]). Hence, an extremely large partnership might not
be socially eﬃcient. The conditions stated in Proposition 2 insures that the
largest partnership is socially desirable, however.
For any non-trivial equilibrium (p,p), conditionally on n individuals par-
ticipating in a partnership, the expected total cost is






that is, the probability that (N−n) individuals standing alone choose action x
(remember that p ≥ p1 > p in a non-trivial equilibrium) and the probability
that the partnership chooses action x. Moreover, the probability that exactly
















hence, the total expected cost is given by





Now consider two non-trivial equilibria (p∗,p∗) and (p,p) such that µ(]p∗,p∗[) >
µ(]p,p[). We can easily show that the ﬁrst term in Equation (10) is smaller
for the equilibrium (p∗,p∗) than (p,p). As for the second term, the complex-
ity of the ﬁnite binomial sum of terms, which also depends on p and p, does
not make it possible to sign its variation. Nonetheless, it is bounded.22 As N
gets larger, the variation in the ﬁrst term dominates the variation in the sec-
ond term, and thus we can conclude that for two equilibria (p∗,p∗) and (p,p)
such that µ(]p∗,p∗[) > µ(]p,p[), a larger partnership is socially desirable.
5 Some comparative statics
In this section, we discuss the changes of the probability to participate in
a partnership at the most comprehensive equilibrium. Our ﬁrst question





n is an increasing sequence in n, the sum is clearly
bounded from below by µ(]p1,p[)cx and from above by µ(]p,p[)Ncx(N). It follows that
the maximal variation is
   µ(]p∗,p∗[)Ncx(N) − µ(]p1,p[)cx
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gains vary. As a preliminary remark, observe that if there is no eﬃciency
gains i.e., γx(n) = γx for all n, then there is a unique equilibrium in which
any type of any individual stands alone. Now, consider two cost functions
γx( ) and γ′
x( ). We say that γx( ) is more eﬃcient than γ′
x( ) if γx(1) = γ′
x(1)
and γx(n) ≤ γ′
x(n) for all n ∈ {2,...,N}.23 We write γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ). Note
that the usual method of comparative statics, namely applying the Implicit
Function Theorem (henceforth, IFT), has little power in our model. Indeed,
although the continuity and smoothness conditions required by the IFT are
met, the complexity of the system of equations (9) does not make it possible
to sign the derivatives. Hence, we prefer to take advantage of a powerful
tool for monotone comparative statics introduced by Milgrom and Roberts




(p,p) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] : p ≥ p
 
,
together with the coalition order >µ i.e., for any pair (p,p), (p′,p′) ∈ Σ,
(p,p) >µ (p′,p′) if and only if µ(]p,p[) ≥ µ(]p′,p′[), is a complete lattice.24 We
deﬁne the highest zero of the map Γ : Σ → R2 as the point (p∗,p∗) satisfying
Γ(p∗,p∗) = 0 and for all (p,p) such that Γ(p,p) = 0, (p∗,p∗) >µ (p,p).
Not surprisingly, the highest zero is the most comprehensive equilibrium,
hence we can apply Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994, p. 451) for
the monotone comparative statics of extreme zeros. Second, the order ≥eff
together with the space of cost functions is clearly an ordered set. Finally,
remember that Γ is a continuous map of p and p.
Proposition 3 There exists a ˆ ∆x such that for all ∆x > ˆ ∆x, higher eﬃ-
ciency gains increase the probability to participate in the partnership i.e., for
γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ), (p∗(γx( )),p∗(γx( ))) >µ (p∗(γ′
x( )),p∗(γ′
x( ))).
The intuition is as follows. An increase in eﬃciency gains increases the
probability β that the partnership takes action x conditional on n individuals
in the partnership (since pn is decreasing in γx( )), hence it increases the ex-
pected payoﬀ to participate in a a partnership E1. Since the expected payoﬀ
23Note that the assumption of γx(1) = γ′
x(1) implies that p1 does not change as we
vary the cost function from γx to γ′
x. This assumption is important in proving that Γ is
decreasing in the cost function.
24A set X together with an order ≥ is a complete lattice if it is a partially ordered set,
and every non-empty subset of X has a greatest lower bound and a least upper bound in
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to stand-alone E0 does not change, it follows that Γ is monotone nondecreas-
ing in γx( ). Moreover, the condition stated in Proposition 3 ensures that
Γ is monotone nondecreasing in the probability to participate in the partner-
ship, i.e., for (p,p) >µ (p′,p′), Γ(p,p) ≥ Γ(p′,p′). Observe that an increase
in the participating probability has an ambiguous eﬀect on Γ. First, for a
given β, it increases the likelihood that a partnership with many individuals
will form, and thus increases the expected payoﬀ to participate in the part-
nership through a cost reduction. Second, an increase in the participating
probability has an ambiguous eﬀect on β. As the participating probability
increases, more pessimistic and more optimistic types might join the part-
nership. If an increase in the participating probability implies that relatively
more optimistic types participate, then β increases, and the expected payoﬀ
to participate in the partnership unambiguously increases. However, if β
decreases, the total variation in the expected payoﬀ is ambiguous. A rela-
tively high payoﬀ associated to action x ensures that the ﬁrst positive eﬀect
oﬀsets the second negative eﬀect. Lastly, since Γ is monotone nondecreasing,
the result simply follows from Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994, p.
451). Thus, the higher the eﬃciency gains, the higher the expected size of
the partnership. An additional remark is worth doing.
Remark 1 For ∆x > ˆ ∆x, the most comprehensive equilibrium is the unique
interim eﬃcient equilibrium.
For relatively high reward, we already know that Γ is monotone nonde-
creasing. We then note that the set of non-trivial equilibria is ordered by the
weak inclusion order (see Appendix 7.7) when Γ is monotone nondecreasing.
It follows that any type participating in the partnership in any alternative
equilibrium also participates in the partnership in the most comprehensive
equilibrium. These types are obviously strictly better-oﬀ in the most compre-
hensive equilibrium.25 Any other type is obviously either better-oﬀ or strictly
better-oﬀ in the most comprehensive equilibrium. Hence, any alternative
equilibrium is interim dominated by the most comprehensive equilibrium,
and, thus, it is the unique interim eﬃcient equilibrium.
The next question concerns the change in the partnership size as the
distribution of beliefs µ varies. We ﬁrst start with a trivial observation,
25Since Γ is monotone nondecreasing in the participating probability, we have for
µ(]p,p[) > µ(]p′,p′[), E1(pi,p,p) > E1(pi,p′,p′) for all pi.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 23
which states that if there is no diﬀerences in opinions (characteristics), then
the most comprehensive equilibrium is the grand partnership.
Remark 2 If µ is degenerate, then the most comprehensive equilibrium is
the grand partnership.
Remark 2 stresses the crucial role of assuming diﬀerences in characteris-
tics for our trade-oﬀ to be meaningful. If there are no diﬀerences in char-
acteristics, then there is no cost associated with the loss of control over the
partnership decision, and therefore, eﬃciency gains imply that the grand
partnership forms.26 Suppose now that there are diﬀerences in characteris-
tics, we are then naturally interested in the change of the partnership ex-
pected size as characteristics become more diverse. That is our next task; it
is again worth noting that despite the simplicity of our model, this task is
quite complicated as the system of equations (9) is not easily tractable.
Suppose that the measure µ is parameterized by l ∈ L, a partially ordered
set; how is the most comprehensive equilibrium aﬀected by an exogenous
change in the parameter l? We again take advantage of the lattice method.
We endow Σ with the coalition order >µl, l ∈ L, i.e., for any pair (p,p),
(p′,p′) ∈ Σ, (p,p) >µl (p′,p′) if and only if µl(]p,p[) ≥ µl(]p′,p′[). For any
l, (Σ,>µl) is obviously a complete lattice. Notice the peculiarity of our
problem, the order relation >µl is also parameterized. We further need to
deﬁne how the probability measures are ordered.
Deﬁnition 2 Two probability measures µl and µl′ (l > l′) are said to be
ordered by the single crossing property in p if for any measurable subsets
[0,x[⊂ B([0,1]), the Borel sigma-algebra on [0,1],
µl([0,x[) ≤ µl′([0,x[) ∀x < p
µl([0,x[) > µl′([0,x[) ∀x ≥ p
.
Deﬁnition 2 simply says that the distribution functions of µl and µl′ cross
only once and at p. Moreover, if p = 1, then µl dominates µl′ in the sense
of the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. It is also easy to see that if, in
addition, µl and µl′ have the same mean, then µl dominates µl′ in the sense
26More precisely, if µ is degenerate in p, s(p) = 1 for all individuals is the unique non-
trivial symmetric equilibrium with equilibrium payoﬀ of max(0,p∆x − γx(N)). However,
there also exists asymmetric equilibria. For instance, if pn+1 ≤ p < pn, there are equilibria
in which up to n − 1 individuals join the partnership and N − n + 1 stand alone.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 24
of the second order stochastic dominance. The lower l, the more diverse the
individuals’ beliefs are.
Proposition 4 Suppose the set of probability measures {µl}l∈L is ordered
by the single crossing property in p1 and ∆x > ˆ ∆x.Then, (p∗(l),p∗(l)) is








For simplicity, assume, in addition, the probability measures {µl}l∈L have
the same mean. Proposition 3 then states that as we shift mass from the
center to the tails, the risk that two individuals, randomly selected, strongly
disagree is higher, and the most comprehensive equilibrium is characterized
by a lower probability to participate in the partnership. In other words, the
more diverse the individuals’ characteristics are, the higher the cost associ-
ated with the loss of control over the decision is, and therefore, the smaller
the expected partnership size.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the endogenous formation of a partnership as the
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency gains and the ‘cost’ associated with the partial
loss of control over the decision the partnership takes. The main novelty
of the paper is then to deﬁne this cost as the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ
an individual gets when he is not pivotal and the payoﬀ he would have got
were he pivotal. We have shown that the higher the eﬃciency gains, the
higher the expected partnership size is, while the more diverse the individuals’
characteristics, the lower the partnership size is. We have also shown that
the largest partnership is not necessarily socially desirable. Indeed, although
the partnership beneﬁts from cost reductions in choosing the costly action,
it might choose it too often. Our trade-oﬀ might also provide an explanation
for the “size principle” in political science (see, Riker (1962)) i.e., parties
create coalitions “just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no
larger”. On the one hand, the more parties to the coalition, the higher the
probability of power or of inﬂuence in the political debate. On the other
hand, the more diverse the parties’ ideologies are, the harder it is to agree
on political platforms or issues, and therefore the less stable the coalition is.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 25
Several interesting issues are left for future research. For instance, if sev-
eral partnerships can form, which partnership structures will we observe?
This is not a trivial question as smaller partnerships might enjoy less scope
for disagreement (a smaller β), but also beneﬁt from less eﬃciency gains. An-
other interesting question would be to consider a model in which eﬃciency
gains do not only come from a pure size eﬀect, but also from a composition
eﬀect. In such a model, the eﬃciency gains of having more diverse character-
istics might well more than compensate from the higher risk of disagreement.
After all, “it takes all sorts to make a world.”
7 Appendix
7.1 A formal description of beliefs
In this section, we present a formal description of the assumption on beliefs
adopted in the text. Following the literature on interactive epistemology
(e.g. Battigalli and Bonanno (1999)), we deﬁne θ as an external state, and
call beliefs about external states ﬁrst-order beliefs. Deﬁning pi(θ) as the
subjective probability of θ for individual i and denoting pi for pi(θ), we have
the following.
B0 Every individual regards the external state θ and the subjective belief
{pj}j∈N\{i} of others as stochastically independent.
B1 All individuals assume that their opponents’ subjective beliefs pi are
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.), drawn from a proba-
bility measure µ on [0,1]. Unless indicated otherwise, µ is assumed to
be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
It is common belief that B0-B1 hold. We can now deﬁne an individual’s
second-order beliefs, that is an individual’s beliefs about the external state
and ﬁrst-order beliefs of the others. For all i ∈ {1,...,N}, pi ∈ [0,1], j  = i,
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It is worth pointing out that beliefs are consistent in the sense that the
marginal of π2
i over {θ,θ} is π1
i. Finally, note that assuming B0-B1 and com-
mon beliefs in B0-B1 allow us to establish a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween pi and i’s hierarchy of beliefs, hence we can refer to pi as the epistemic
type (or type, for short) of individual i.










max(0,pi∆x − γx(n)) +
n − 1
n
β (n,s)pi(∆x − γx(n))
 
is strictly increasing in pi regardless of s, and thus strictly quasi-concave.
Deﬁne T := {pi ∈ [0,1] : pi < p1}, as the set of types that choose action x,
and denote T c the complement of T in [0,1]. In the sequel, we write E1(pi, )
for “ E1(pi,s) for any strategy function s”.
Consider (pi,p′
i) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] such that E1(pi, ) ≥ max(0,pi∆x − γx)
E1 (p′
i, ) ≥ max(0,p′
i∆x − γx), and any α ∈ (0,1). We shall show that
E
1(αpi + (1 − α)p
′
i, ) > max(0,(αpi + (1 − α)p
′
i)∆x − γx). (11)
First, if (pi,p′
i) ∈ T × T, (11) is trivially satisﬁed since E1 is strictly quasi-
concave in pi. Second, if pi ∈ T, p′
i ∈ T c, and αpi + (1 − α)p′
i ∈ T, we shall
show that
E
1(αpi + (1 − α)p
′
i, ) > 0.
One again, this is trivially true by the strict quasi-concavity of E1. Third, if
pi ∈ T, p′
i ∈ T c, and αpi + (1 − α)p′
i ∈ T c, we shall show that
E
1 (αpi + (1 − α)p
′
i, ) > (αpi + (1 − α)p
′
i)∆x − γx. (12)
To prove this last statement, we ﬁrst need a Lemma.
Lemma 3 For all pi ∈ T c, E1 (pi, ) − (pi∆x − γx) is decreasing in pi.









(pi∆x − γx(n)) +
n − 1
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β (n, )(pi∆x − γx(n))
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the convex hull of {∆x,...,
1+(N−1)β(N, )





Finally, the slope of pi∆x − γx is ∆x, and thus E1(pi, ) − (pi∆x − γx) is
decreasing in pi. ￿
By Lemma 3, it thus follows that (12) holds. Similarly, we can show that
if (pi,p′
i) ∈ T c × T c, and αpi + (1 − α)p′
i ∈ T c, (12) holds. This completes
the proof.
7.3 Binomial formula
In this section, we give a result about binomial sums for increasing ﬁnite
sequences {an}N
n=1. i.e., sequences with a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ... ≤ aN. This result is
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For n < Np, we have an ≤ a[Np], and since n − Np < 0 for such n, it follows








































because an ≥ a[Np] and n − Np ≥ 0. Combining the two inequalities yields
f
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n−1 (1 − p)
N−n−1
= a[Np] (Np − Np) = 0,
which is the desired result. Note that if there is at least one strict inequality
between the an’s, a strict inequality for f′ (p) will follow. Moreover, if we
consider a decreasing sequence i.e., a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aN, the reverse inequality
trivially holds.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the existence of at least one non-trivial equilibrium, we rely on
arguments from Index Theory. Note that we do not use usual ﬁxed point
arguments since we cannot guarantee that the domain of Γ(p,p) − (p,p)
is Σ. Remember that if N = 2, there is a non-trivial equilibrium with
(p,p) = (p2,1). From now, assume N ≥ 3.
First, observe that a non-trivial equilibrium necessarily satisﬁes (p,p) ∈
T × T c ⊂ Σ (T c being the complement of T in [0,1]), with
T :=
 
pi ∈ [0,1] : pi < p
1 
,
the set of types that choose action y whenever they stand alone. The proof
proceeds by contradiction. First, suppose that (p,p) ∈ T × T, then wePartnerships, April 7, 2006 29
have E1(p,p,p) = 0 from the deﬁnition of T and an equilibrium. Since E1
is increasing in pi (see (5)), we then have E1(p,p,p) > 0, a contradiction.
Second, suppose that (p,p) ∈ T c × T c, then we have E1(p,p,p) − p∆x −
γx = 0 from the deﬁnition of T c and an equilibrium. As already mentioned,
E1( ,p,p) − E0 ( ) is decreasing in pi for pi ∈ T C (see Appendix 7.2, Lemma
3), hence E1(p,p,p)−p∆x−γx > 0, again a contradiction. Finally, if (p,p) =
(0,1), it is trivially true. Therefore, at a non-trivial equilibrium, we have
p < p1 ≤ p. This implies that β(n,s)  = 0 in any non-trivial equilibrium.
Second, we have pN ≤ p at a non-trivial equilibrium. Note that since
γx(N) < ∆x, we have pN > 0. By contradiction, suppose that pN > p
at a non-trivial equilibrium, hence all types pi ∈]p,pN[ participate in the
partnership. However, for all types pi ∈]p,pN[, we have E1(pi,p,p) < 0 =
E0(pi) independently of p since for these types, action x is strictly dominated
by y (i.e., pi∆x < γx(N)). Hence p ∈ [pN,p1[. (In other words, E1(pi,s) < 0
for any pi ≤ pN at any non-trivial equilibrium s with N ≥ 3.) Similarly, it
is easy to see that, independently of p ∈ T, we have p  = p1. It follows that a
non-trivial equilibrium point (p,p) necessarily belongs to [pN,p1[×]p1,1], an
open subset of Σ.
The last step in proving the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium consists
in proving the existence of a zero of Γ. To do so, we construct a mapping
h : [pN,p1] × [p1,1] → R2 that admits a unique zero in the interior of its
domain and that has the same degree than Γ, hence Γ admits a zero.27














Note that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of h is −1, hence is
of full rank, and the index of h is +1. It follows that h has a zero. More-
over, we have the following boundary conditions for h. limp→pN h1(p,p) < 0,
limp→p1 h1(p,p) > 0, limp→p1 h2(p,p) > 0, and limp→1 h2(p,p) < 0. As for
Γ, from the above observations, we have the following boundary conditions.
limp→pN Γ1(p,p) ≤ 0, limp→p1 Γ1(p,p) ≥ 0, limp→p1 Γ2(p,p) ≥ 0.
27Loosely speaking, the degree of a function at a 0 with respect to a bounded, open set
counts the solution in that set in a particular way. Two functions have the same degree at
0 if they do no point into opposites directions at the boundary. See Mass-Colell (1985).Partnerships, April 7, 2006 30
In a technical appendix available on my webpage, I prove the following:
Corollary A Let f : int[0,1]n → Rn be a continuous mapping. If for
any x = (x1,...,xi,...,xn) ∈ [0,1]n such that xi = 0, fi(x) ≤ 0, for any
x = (x1,...,xi,...,xn) ∈ [0,1]n such that xi = 1, fi(x) ≥ 0, then f has a
zero in the interior of [0,1]n.
We can then apply Corollary A to prove the existence of a zero of Γ.
More precisely, if limp→1 Γ2(p,p) ≤ 0, then the existence follows directly
from Theorem A. If limp→1 Γ2(p,p) ≥ 0, we have that p = 1, and the proof
follows then by the Intermediate Value Theorem.
7.5 p < 1
We want to show that there exists parameters of the model for which it is not
an equilibrium to have all types of an individuals above p to participate in
a partnership, hence p < 1. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Consider
the strategy : s(pi) = 1 for any pi > p, and s(pi) = 0, otherwise. Hence, we
explicitly consider a proﬁle of strategies such that p = 1. Let us show that
individual i with high enough pi > p1 might have an incentive to deviate.
First, as argued in the text, note that we must have p < p2 for s to be
an equilibrium. For simplicity, suppose that γx(3)  = γx(2) and p > p3. It
follows that β(2,s) < 1 and β(n,s) = 1 for any n ≥ 3. We then have for an






ϕ(n − 1,s)[γx(1) − γx(n)] + ϕ(1,s)
1
2
(β(2,s) − 1)(pi∆x − γx(2)).












(pi∆x − γx(2)) < 0
for ε small enough, ∆x − γx(2) large enough and µ([p2,1]) small enough.
Hence, an individual with type pi high enough has an incentive to deviate,
which is a contradiction with s being an equilibrium.Partnerships, April 7, 2006 31
7.6 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two non-trivial equilibria, (p,p) and (p′,p′), such that µ(]p,p[) =
q = µ(]p′,p′[). We have to show that (p′,p′) = (p,p). The proof proceeds




















(pi∆x − γx(m + 1))
< 0,
since µ(]max(p,pm+1),p[) < µ(]max(p′,pm+1),p′[). It follows that 0 = E1(p,p,p) <
E1(p,p′,p′) implying that p′ < p for (p′,p′) to be an equilibrium (i.e., E1(p′,p′,p′) =
0), hence ]p′,p′[⊃]p,p[, contradicting µ(]p,p[) = µ(]p′,p′[). Therefore if two
non-trivial equilibria have the same expected coalition size, they are identical.
7.7 Monotone Comparative Statics
Part a: Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994, p. 451)
The key tool for the comparative statics is Theorem 3 of Milgrom and
Roberts (1994), which states that if f : X×T → X is monotone nondecreas-
ing in x and t, X with the order ≥X is a complete lattice, and T is partially or-
dered set, then the highest ﬁxed point xH(t) of f is non-decreasing in t. Note
that Theorem 3 is stated for ﬁxed points, but it can be equivalently stated
in terms of zeros, simply apply Theorem 3 to g with g(x,t) = x − f(x,t),
such that a ﬁxed point of f is a zero of g.
Part b: Suﬃcient conditions to apply the theorem?
We shall show that the mapping Γ is monotone non-decreasing, that is,
for (p,p) >µ (p′,p′), Γ(p,p,γx( )) ≥ Γ(p′,p′,γx( )), and for γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ),
Γ(p,p,γx( )) ≥ Γ(p,p,γ′
x( )). However, these conditions are diﬃcult to check
in our problem. We can however check more easily suﬃcient conditions.





























x( )). (ii)Partnerships, April 7, 2006 32
if γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ). Indeed, if these inequalities hold for all pi ∈ [0,1], they
hold in particular for p and p, hence the desired result.
Part c: Conditions for (i) and (ii) to hold.
We ﬁrst consider condition (ii). First, observe that for γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ),
the threshold p1 is identical for both cost functions. Second, it is easy to
see that E1 
pi,p,p,γx( )
 
is a nondecreasing function of γx( ) since pi∆x −
γx( ) and β( ,p,p) are. Moreover, E0(pi,γx( )) is also nondecreasing. Since

















(β(n,p,p) − 1)(pi∆x − γx(n)).
It then follows that for γx( ) ≥eff γ′
x( ), E1 
pi,p,p,γx( )
 






x( )) since pn is weakly decreasing in γx( ), and
hence β(n,p,p) increasing in γx( ).
Let us now consider condition (i), that is, the property that Γ is monotone
nondecreasing in (p,p). Let us ﬁrst show that the property holds for p2 = pN.
Assume that p2 = pN. Since p ≥ pN in any non-trivial equilibrium, we













[(pi∆x − γx(n)) − max(pi∆x − γx(1),0)].
(13)
Since ((pi∆x − γx(n)) − max(pi∆x − γx(1),0))N
n=2 is a strictly increasing se-
quence in n, the result follows with strict inequality (see the section on
binomial formula). The condition p2 = pN clearly holds if N = 2 or
cx(N) = cx(2), that if there is no eﬃciency gains by enlarging the partnership
from 2 to N partners. We now show that Γ is monotone non-decreasing for
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From the continuity of E1 in p2, there exists a ε > 0 such that for any p2 ∈
Bε(pN), the open ball around pN of radius ε, Γ(p,p,γx( ))) ≥ Γ(p′,p′,γx( )))







hence there exists a ˆ ∆x such that for ∆x > ˆ ∆x, the condition holds.
7.8 Proposition 4
We only present a sketch of the proof. We already know that Γ is mono-
tone nondecreasing in (p,p) under the condition stated in Proposition 4, i.e.,
for (p,p) >µ (p′,p′), Γ(p,p,l) ≥ Γ(p′,p′,l). Moreover, for l > l′, we have
Γ(p,p,l) ≥ Γ(p,p,l′).
Hence, the map Γ is monotone nondecreasing, and it follows from Theo-
rem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) that µl(]p∗(l),p∗(l)[) ≥ µl(]p∗(l′),p∗(l′)[).
Finally, since p∗(l) < p1 ≤ p∗(l), we have the desired result µl(]p∗(l),p∗(l)[) ≥
µl′(]p∗(l′),p∗(l′)[) by the single-crossing property in p1.
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